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MEDIATION AND OTHER CREATIVE
ALTERNATIVES TO LITIGATING
FAMILY LAW ISSUES
By GARY A. WEISSMAN* AND CHRISTINE M. LEICK**
I. TRENDS IN FAMILY LAW
An attorney who forsook matrimonial law in 1960 for
municipal bond work, or something equally somnolent, would be
thunderstruck upon his return to family law in 1985.1 Accustomed
to hiring investigators to prove adultery, intemperance, willful
desertion, or mental cruelty, this jurisprudential Rip Van Winkle
would find, to his chagrin, no fault divorce, 2 joint legal and
physical custody,3  short-term "rehabilitative" alimony,4  and
*Gary A. Weissman, J.D., Leonard, Street & Dcinard, Minneapolis, MN; Chairperson,
Arbitration and Mediation Committee, Minnesota State Bar Family Law Section; Mediation
Panelist, American Arbitration Association Alternative Dispute Resolutio Project; Mediator, The
Mediation Center for Dispute Resolution.
- Christine M. Leick, J.D., Fellow, American Acadlmv of Matritonial Lawyers; author and
Continuing Legal Education lecturer on Family Law topics; officer and director, Arthur, Chapman,
Michaelson and McDonough, P.A., Minneapolis, MN.
1. The authors are not being inadvertently sexist: whereas a sexually integrated family law bar
exists today, in 1960 there were very few female attorneys, and only a miniscule number of them
practiced matrimonial law.
2. The sole ground for divorce under Minnesota law is "an irretrievable breakdown of the
marriage relationship." MINN. STAT. § 518.06(1) (1984). North Dakota Century Code § 14-05-03
includes "irreconcilable differences" among the traditional grounds for divorce. N.D. CENT. Con.3 §
14-05-03 (8) (1981). See Rummel v. Rummel, 265 N.W.2d 230, 235 (N.D. 1978) (tde court is not
required to make findings regarding the conduct or fault of the parties)..
3. At least 30 states have some form ofjoint custody. Freed & Fostcr, .upra note 2, at 417-21. See
also, t.g., MINN. STAT. § 518.17(3)(a) (1984). Section 518.17(3)(a) of the Minnesot Statutes prtvides
that: 'Upon adjudging the nullity of a marriage, or a dissolutitst or separation, or a child custody
pirtceding, tlie court shall make such further order as it dcins just and proper concerning: (a) tlie
legal custody of' the minor child ren of the parties which shall be sole orjoint ... ." Id. (emphasis added).
4. See Freed & Foster, supra note 2, at 382-88. See also, e.g., N.D. CE-N'T. CoDE § 14-05-24 (1981).
Sectitin 14-05-24 of the North Dakota Century Code provides as fotlltws:
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"equitable distribution" of assets, 5 including pension rights and
professional practices and degrees. He would confront such an
explosion in the number of divorces that many of the courts in
which he would practice would now be employing full-time family
court referees. 6
The transformation in family law of the past twenty-five years
gives rise to an either-or proposition about the remainder of the
twentieth century: Either the changes that have taken place in the
American family, and hence in the family law, have run their
course, and we should expect several decades of stability without
significant changes; or the no-change position is ahistorical,
hopelessly naive, and, to coin a word, "epochocentric." The
authors subscribe to the latter view.
It would be pointless to try to predict with precision or
certainty the exact nature and shape of the changes to come, but the
trend seems clear on at least one crucial dimension: The next few
decades will witness the increasing development, evolution, and
use of dispute resolution mechanisms other than court trials to
dissolve marriages and to bring closure to custody disputes. For the
reasons set forth below, the authors believe that mediation is the
most viable of the potential alternative dispute resolution devices.
It would be a mistake, however, to infer that the other options are
inferior. The very availability of optional methods itself fulfills
another likely family law trend - increasing the disputants'
control of the process.
II. WHY ALTERNATIVE METHODS OF DISPUTE
RESOLUTION?
The exploration of alternative methods of dispute resolution
for family law matters is based on the premise that problems
inherent in the present methods mandate the development and use
When a divorce is granted, the court shall make such equitable distribution of the real
and personal property of the parties as may seem just and proper, and may compel
either of the parties to provide for the maintenance of the children of thc marriage, and
to make such suitable allowances to the other party for support duringlife orfora shorter
period as to the court may seem just. having regard to the circumstances of the parties
respectively. The court from time to time may modify its orders in these respects.
Id. (emphasis added).
5. See Freed & Foster, supra note 2, at 379-81. See also, e-g., N.D. CENT. CODE S 14-05-24 (1981).
For the text ofS 14-05-24 ofthe North Dakota Century Code, see supra note 4.
6. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 484.65(7) (1984) (creating a Family Court Division of the District
Court for the FourthJudicial District).
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of new or alternative systems. Thus, we must first analyze the
problems in the current system of resolving family law disputes.
A. CRITICISMS OF THE TRADITIONAL PROCESS
Some critics argue that American divorce law is an historical
anachronism, 7 a twentieth century legacy from ecclesiastical court
precepts adopted by the newly independent states in the post-
Revolutionary era. No-fault divorce has undercut the medieval
assumptions about subordination of women and the non-
dissolubility of marriage; yet the State, functioning in the place of
the Church, still presumes to make a variety of intrusive decisions
about divorcing families. These include whether a home-owner
may live in his or her own house, and whether and how often a
parent can see his or her own children. The State interfers by
applying the adversarial notions from formalized civil procedure to
an area deemed sufficiently disparate from other disputes that, as
one observer puts it, "marriage has involved the only form of
private contract in which the partners, in order to be released, had
to secure permission of the court which maintained the right to
decide whether or not dissolution of the marriage was justified. "8
Most criticisms of the present adversarial and judicial systems
of divorce, however, are aimed less at historical anomaly than at
what the critics perceive as practical and philosophical weaknesses
in divorce litigation. The criticisms include the following: The
courts are clogged, making the process exasperatingly long; 9
divorces are expensive; 10 the system exacerbates rather than
mitigates conflict between parties who have had intimate
relationships and who, if they have children, will continue to be
parents; 1" divorce law and procedure inappropriately apply
principles and rules honed in the commercial arena to an
emotionally-charged interpersonal context; 12 the divorce process
launders marital linen in public; 13 and the system strips parents of
7. See Brown, Divorce and Family Mediation: History, Review, Future Directions, 20 CONCILIATION
Crs. Rrv. 1(1982).
8. Id. at 3.
9. See, e.g., Folberg, Divorce Mediation - A Workable Alternative, in ALTERNATIVE MEANS OF FAMILY
Disi'u i-F RESOLUTION 11 (1982).
10. Se generally Flanders, Divorce Mediation - A New Alternative, 29 LA. B.J. 239 (1982)
(inediaion is potentially less expensive and faster than adjudication).
11. Meroney, Mediation and Arbitration of Separation and Divorce Agreements, 15 WAKE FOREST L.
Risv. 467 (1)79).
12. Riskin, Mediation and Lawyers, 43 01110 ST. L.J. 29 (1982).
13. Sander, lVarieties qfDisputc Processing, 70 F.R.D. 111 (1976).
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NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
their authority and confers power to make life-long decisions about
their children upon strangers. 14
Few would argue that these criticisms lack merit. The question
is whether we can solve these problems by modifying the present
system to develop special rules for family court matters, expedite
divorce trials, render divorce trials less expensive, and protect the
litigants' privacy, or whether something is so systemically wrong
with litigating marital disputes that no amount of modification will
remedy the problems.
Perhaps the question should be reversed, as Chief Justice
Warren Burger has posed it, albeit declaratively: "[C]ourts should
resolve only what can't be resolved in some other way . . .we must
consider whether the court system is the best way to resolve many
of the matters now handled in the adversary system. "115 Thus,
assuming a tabula rasa, we ask what system or systems would most
effectively resolve the needs of the marital disputants.
B. DESIRABILITY OF PRIVATE ORDERING
1. Independence
"Self-actualization" was a generic term of the 1970s for the
various processes, activities, and therapeutic modes that promoted
personal grov, th.16 The term, though jargonistic and trendy,
reflects an increasingly perceived need for individuals to take more
control over and responsibility for their own lives. The mental
health profession has long acknowledged personal autonomy as a
therapeutic goal, and contemporary divorce therapy generally
seeks to lessen the clients' dependence on their spouses, parents,
and professional therapists. 1
7
The contradiction between the goal of self-actualization and
the reality of passive dependence upon lawyers and courts to solve
divorce-related problems inevitably results in a crisis that every
divorcing person must resolve. The ones who choose to transfer
their dependency needs to their attorneys have a difficult time
bringing closure to their divorces, and prolonged litigation
postpones the feared disengagement with their spouses. Those who
consciously choose independence as a psychological as well as
14. Spencer & Zammit, Mediation - Arbitration. A Proposalfor Private Resolution oJDisputes Between
Divorced or Separated Parents, 1976 DuKE L.J. 911.
15. Lieberman, A No-Lose Proposition, NEVSWVELK, Feb. 21, 1983, at 14 (quoting ChiefJustice
Warren Berger).
16. SeJ. FOLBERG & A. TAYLOR, MEDIATION 76-77 (1984).
17. See, e.g., B. FISHER, REBUILDING WHEN YOUR REt.AFIONSIII ENDs(1981).
266 [VOL. 61:263
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financial objective may begin to insist upon greater control over the
legal aspects of the divorce as well.
As the public demand for greater personal involvement in the
dissolution process increases, the practice of family law will have to
change. For some clients, a more active role in the negotiating
process may suffice. But for others, it will be important to generate
options in addition to attorney-drafted settlement agreements and
court trials conducted with unfamiliar and uncomfortable rules.
With close to half of all American marriages ending in divorce,
the movement for private ordering of that process is likely to
proceed with or without the leadership of the organized bar. It
behooves both bench and bar to be on the cutting edge of this trend
rather than to attempt to suppress it or to reluctantly follow a lay
leadership frustrated with what the judicial system has wrought.
2. Privacy
American society has slowly been ejecting the government
from its homes and bedrooms. On a continuum from private
ordering 8 to government intrusion, divorce remains an area of
high governmental coercion in intimate matters of citizens' private
lives. The United States Supreme Court has discerned a
penumbral right to privacy, at least with respect to child rearing,' 9
procreation,20 contraception, 2' abortion,22 and cohabitation.2 3 To
be sure, every state still imposes restrictions upon who can marry
by gender, age, relationship, mental capacity, and marital status.
2 4
18. See Mnookin & Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case oJ Divorce, 88 YALE
L.J. 950 (1979). The concept of private ordering has been articulated by others using different
phrases such as "[thel parties reach their own agreemetnt," Rigbv. Alternative Dispute Resolution, 44
LA. L. REV. 1725, 1743 (1984); "client autonony," Friedman & Anderson, Divorce Mediations
Strengths, CAL. LAW., July 1983, at 36; and "controllling] my private life mysef,'' 1. Ricci, Mom's
Housii/DAD's HousF: MAKING SIARED CUSTODN WVORK 149 (1980).
19. Pierce v. Society of'Sistcrs, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
20. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
21. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
22. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
23. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
24. See, e.g., U.Nto. MARRI.GL AND DIVORC AcT 208(a), 9A U.L.A. 1I0 (1979). Section 208(a)
ol'the U niforin Marriage and Divorce Act provides as filows:
(a) The 1 - 1 court shall enter its decree declaring the invalidity of a marriage
entered in to undei the lollowing iricu istances:
(1) a party lacked capacity to conset to the marriage at tlie time the
marriage was soletmnized, citlier because of mental incapacity or infirmity or
because of the influence of alcohol, drugs, or other incapsacitating substances,
or i parts was induced to enter into i marriage by forcc of duress, or 1y, fraud
involving the essentials of iarriage;
(2) a party lacks tlie physical calsacity it cinsummate the marriage by
sexual intercourse, and at th ie tiI e marriage was stlemnized the other party
did not know of the incapacitsy,
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Yet every American jurisdiction has some form of no-fault
divorce, 25  indicating a clear direction toward the private
ordering of marital matters, including dissolution. However, courts
still stand in loco parentis (in place of the parents) when it comes to
child custody. 26 Although courts in fact rarely set aside a stipulation
for marital dissolution absent patent unfairness, they do retain the
power to thwart a mutual custody decision of the parents. 27
The potential for post-dissolution arrangements adverse to
minor children impels some residual judicial power to protect
children. As Mnookin and Kornhauser have written, "to
acknowledge this responsibility [for child protection], however, is
not to define its limits. "28 Current mental health literature supports
the contention that what is really in the best interest of the children




Mental health research will not in and of itself impel the
generation of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms. A point
worth emphasizing is that there are a variety of facets in the concept
of "private ordering," and different alternative methods may
respond to different needs of divorcing couples to exert greater
control over the process. Some couples may want to control the
content, others the forum, still others the procedure or the time of
their divorce.
Most court-annexed alternative dispute resolution programs
developed in response to the judiciary's complaint about clogged
dockets. These programs have only incidentally accommodated the
disputants' needs to find new ways to legally uncouple. A
(3) a party [was under the age of 16 years and did not have the consent of
his parents or guardian and judicial approval or] was aged 16 or 17 years and
did not have the consent of his parents or guardian orjudicial approval; or
(4) the marriage is prohibited.
Id.
25. For a discussion of no-fault divorce, see supra note 2 and accompanying text.
26. Rabutse v. Rabuse, 304 Minn. 460, 463, 231 N.W.2d 493, 495 (1975) ("[t]his power to
protect infants is exercised by the state as an attribute of its sovereigny") (quoting Anderson v.
Anderson, 260 Minn. 226, 230, 109 N.W.2d 571, 575 (1961)).
27. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-05-22 (1981) (the court may give such direction for the custody,
care, and education of the children of the marriage as may seem necessary or proper); Id. § 14-09-
06.1 (the best interests of the child is the determining factor in awarding custody); UNtF. MARRIAGE
AND DIVORCE ACT S 402, 9A U.L.A. 197 (1979) (the court shall determine custody in accordance
with the best interests of the child).
28. Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 18, at 957.
29. Id. at 956 (citing Note, Lawyeringfor the Child: Principles of Represention in Custody and Visitation
Disputes Arising From Divorce, 87 YALE L.J. 1126, 1126-32 (1978)).
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smorgasbord of options, each with certain advantages and each
capable of solving some but not all of the problems identified with
the adversary system, would be optimal. And there is no reason to
think that the alternatives described here exhaust the possibilities.
Others may very well emerge by the end of the century. It may,
however, be quite disruptive, though ameliorative, to the
traditional practice of family law if some or all of these alternatives
are routinely available to divorcing spouses.
C. ALTERNATIVES
Western civilization has fashioned several alternatives to the
adjudication of disputes: voting, self-help, coin-tossing, avoidance,
administrative tribunals, ombudspersons, negotiation, arbitration,
mediation, mini-trials, decision analysis, and "med-arb" (a hybrid
of mediation and arbitration). 30 Voting, ombudspersons, and coin-
tossing are not very useful for family law disputes. Family courts
may utilize administrative processes by invoking the assistance of a
social service welfare agency 3' as an adjunct to ligitation. Too
many clients rely on either avoidance or self-help, to the annoyance
of their attorneys. Negotiation is, of course, the current preference.
Arbitration and mediation should not be discounted, however, and
bear closer examination.
III. ARBITRATION
Arbitration is closer to private ordering than is the judicial
system, but it too is an adjudicative option since it involves a third-
party decision-maker. Arbitration differs from the judicial model in
that the parties may select the decision-maker and may contract to
define the scope of the substantive issues and procedural rules.
32
Arbitration is, in effect, a private court system which renders
decisions that are enforceable in the public judicial system. Its
decisions are final, since by statute and decision an arbitrator's
30. The list is a composite of one developed by F. Sander and one created by J. Wolf. See
Sander, supra note 13, at 111-17; Wolf, Alternative Dispute Resolution: One Perspective, HENNEPIN LAW.,
May-June 1984, at 8.
31. See MtN. STAT. § 518.167(a) (1984) (the court may order an investigation and report from
the county welfare agency or department of court services concerning custodial arrangements); N.D.
CEN T. CODE 5 14-09-06.3 (1981) (the court may designate a qualified person or agency to investigate
and report on custodial arrangements).
32. Much of this section first appeared in written materials prepared by Gary Weissman for
Hamline Advanced Legal Education Seminar on Marital Dissolution. See G. Weissman, Alternatives
to the Adversary-Judicial Model for Resolving Family Disputes (1983) (unpublished manuscript).
19851
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award will not be disturbed by the courts absent fraud or
collusion.
33
Arbitration emerged in the 1880s as a response to the
complaints of businessmen frustrated by the congestion and
formalism of judicial proceedings. 34 It is used extensively in labor
and commercial law but only infrequently outside those areas.
35
Crowded court dockets prompted the use of mandatory non-
binding arbitration for small and intermediate-sized claims in
Philadelphia as early as 195236 and subsequently in at least eight
states, the District of Columbia, and four federal districts.
37
In 1984, the Minnesota Legislature enacted an enabling
statute authorizing the judges in any state judicial district to
promulgate rules, subject to the approval of the Minnesota
Supreme Court, for mandatory nonbinding arbitration of civil
33. See UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 12, 9 U.L.A. 140 (1985). Section 12 of the Uniform
Arbitration Act provides as follows:
(a) Upon application of a party, the court shall vacate an award where:
(i) The award was procured by corruption, fraud or other undue means;
(2) There was evident partiality by an arbitrator appointed as a neutral or
corruption in any of the arbitrators or misconduct prejudicing the rights of any
party;
(3) The arbitrators exceeded their powers;
(4) The arbitrators refused to postpone the hearing upon sufficient cause
being shown therefor or refused to hear evidence material to the contrary or
otherwise so conducted the hearing, contrary to the provisions of Section 5, as
to prejudice substantially the rights ofa party; or
(5) There was no arbitration agreement and the issue was not adversely
determined in proceedings under Section 2 and the party did not participate in
the arbitration hearing without raising the objection;
but the fact that the reliefwas such that it could not or would not be granted by
a court of law or equity is not ground for vacating or refusing to confirm the
award.
Id. See also Papenfuss v. Abe W. Mathews Eng'g Co., 397 F. Supp. 165, 166 (W.D. Wis. 1975)
(court should not overturn an arbitrator's award in the absence of serious misconduct); State ex rel.
Sundquist v. Minnesota Teamsters Public & Law Enforcement Employees Union Local No. 320,
316 N.W.2d 542, 544 (Minn. 1982) (the general rule is that an arbitrator, in the absence of any
agreement limiting his or her authority, is the final judge of both law and fact).
34. J. Pearson, An Evaluation of Alternatives to Court Adjudication, 4 (Jan. 15, 1983)
(unpublished manuscript).
35. Sander, supra note 13, at 126.
36.J. Pearson, supra note 34, at 4-5.
37. Dosal, Court Annexed Mandatory, Non-Binding Arbitration in Civil Cases, (Dee. 1982), reprinted in
HENNEPIN LAW., May-June 1984, at 8.
38. See Act of May 2, 1984, ch. 634, 1984 Minn. Laws 1976 (codified at MINN. STAT. S 484.73
(Supp. 1985)). The Act provides as follows:
Subdivision 1. A majority of the Judges of a judicial district may authorize the
establishment of a system of mandatory, nonbinding arbitration within the district to
assist the court in disposing of any controversy existing between two parties which is
the subject of a civil action.
Subd. 2. Judicial arbitration may not be used to dispose of matters relating to
guardianship, conservatorship, or civil commitment, matters within thejuvenile court
jurisdiction involving neglect, dependency, or delinquency, matters involving
termination of parental rights under sections 260.221 to 260.245, or matters arising
under sections 518B.01, 626.557, or 144.651 to 144.652.
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matters.38 Such a plan has already been approved for the largest
judicial district in the state, encompassing Hennepin County and
Minneapolis, but its proposed rules exclude family law
arbitration. 39 The judges in Minnesota's second largest judicial
district, which includes Ramsey County and St. Paul, considered a
plan that would have provided mandatory nonbinding arbitration
exclusively for family law matters, which account for the majority
of civil filings in that district, but they chose mandatory mediation
instead.
40
A. ARBITRABILITY OF FAMILY LAW MATTERS
At common law, many jurisdictions held any arbitration
agreement unenforceable on the ground that they
unconstitutionally usurped the courts' jurisdiction.4 ' Since the
enactment of the Federal Arbitration Act 42 and the adoption by
various states of the Uniform Arbitration Act, however, public
policy now clearly favors arbitrated settlements with only minimal
judicial interference. As of 1982, only nine states prohibited
enforcement of agreements to arbitrate future controversies. 43 In
1957, Minnesota became the first jurisdiction in the United States
to adopt the Uniform Arbitration Act. 44 Even as early as 1943
Minnesota had affirmed the enforceability of agreements to
arbitrate in the future, 45 and the Minnesota Supreme Court has
consistently upheld arbitration agreements and awards since
Minnesota's adoption of the Uniform Arbitration Act. 4
6
Subd. 3. Rules governing pleadings, practice, procedure, jurisdiction and forms
forjudicial arbitration shall be promulgated by a majorit of thejudges in the district,
subject to the approval of the supreme court. The uniform arbitration act shall not be
construed to apply to arbitration under this section except as otherwise provided in the
rules of thejudicial district.
Id.
39. Remele, Hennepin County Adopts Mandatory Non-Binding Arbitration, HENNEPIN LAW., March-
April 1985, at 6, 6.
40. Interview with Gordon Griller, Ramsey Count), District Court Administrator (Dec. 17,
1984).
41. Meroney, supra note 11, at 473.
42. 9 U.S.C. §§ I to 208 (1982).
43. G. GOLDBERG, A LAWYER'S GUIDE TO COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, 6 & n. 5 (2d ed. 1983). As
of 1982, the following states refused to enforce agreements to arbitrate future disputes: Alabama,
Kentucky, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, North Dakota, Vermont, and West Virginia. Id.
In 1985 the North Dakota Legislature amended S 32-04-12 of the North Dakota Century Code,
thereby permitting the specific enforcement of arbitration agreements. See Act of March 31, 1985, ch.
373, 1985 N.D. Sess. Laws 1403.
44. See UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT, Table of Jurisdictions Wherein Act Has Been Adopted, 9 U.L.A. 1
(1985).
45. See Park Constr. Co. v. Independant School Dist. No. 32, 216 Minn. 27, 11 N.W.2d 649
(1943) (enforcing arbitration clause in contract for construction of athletic field).
46. See, e.g., Dunshee v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 303 Minn. 473, 228 N.W.2d 567 (1975)
(Uniform Arbitration Act manifests the state's policy favoring arbitration for the informal, speedy,
and inexpensive resolution of disputes).
1985]
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Whether family law matters can successfully be arbitrated is as
yet unclear. The Minnesota Uniform Arbitration Act provides that
"[a] written agreement to submit any existing controversy to
arbitration . . . is valid, enforceable, and irrevocable, save upon
such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any
contract. "7 Neither Minnesota's Supreme Court nor its court of
appeals has yet confronted an arbitration issue in the family law
area. The Minnesota Supreme Court has held that arbitrators
cannot determine constitutional issues,4 8  but arbitrators are
otherwise empowered to decide the scope of the issues to be
arbitrated. 
4 9
Although Minnesota's Uniform Arbitration Act expressly
provides that the unavailability in court of a remedy fashioned by
an arbitrator is not a basis for vacating the arbitration award, 50 the
Minnesota Supreme Court has construed that section to reserve a
right to challenge any question decided by the arbitrator.
51
Moreover, the court found that the enactment of the former Public
Employee Relations Act represented a legislative intent that there
be an exclusive remedy for public employee grievances, thereby
excluding arbitration. 52 Arguing by analogy, one might contend
47. MINN. STAT. § 572.08 (1984) (emphasis added).
48. See McGrath v. State, 312 N.W. 2d 438, 442 (Minn. 1981) (irrespective of the language in
the arbitration agreement, the arbitrator has no authority to decide constitutiorml issues).
49. Atcas v. Credit Clearing Corp. of America, 292 Minn. 334, 340-41, 197 N.W.2d 448, 452
(1972) (if the intent of the parties regarding the scope of arbitration is reasonably debatable, the
arbitrator initially determines the scope subject to judicial review pursuant to § 572.19 of the
Minnesota Statutes).
50. MINN. STAT. § 572.19(l)(1984).
51. See Rosenberger v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 309 N.W.2d 305, 309 (Minn. 1981). In
Rosenberger, the plaintiff was injured in an accident involving two uninsured motorcycles. Id. at 306-
07. The plaintiff sought to recover uninsured motorist benefits under two policies of no-fault
automobile insurance belonging to her stepfather. Id. at 307. The defendant insurer denied
coverage, claiming that the plaintiff was not a resident of her stepfather's household and therefore
was not covered under the policies. Id. Pursuant to an arbitration clause in the policies, the dispute
was submitted to a panel of three arbitrators, who concluded that the plaintiff could not recover. Id.
Plaintiff then moved the district court to vacate the award on the ground that the arbitrators had
exceeded their authority in determining the residency requirement. Id. The district court concluded
that the residency determination should be reviewed de novo, and found for the plaintiff. Id.
On appeal, the Minnesota Supreme Court found the question of residence the equivalent to a
question of coverage. Id. at 308. Drawing on a previous decision in which the court found identical
language to create a reasonable debate as to whether coverage was arbitrable, the court found the
arbitration award reviewable de novo. Id. See Dunshee v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 303
Minn. 473, 480, 228 N.W.2d 567, 572 (1975) (questions concerning coverage of insurance policies
arc reviewable de novo). Addressing defendant's contention that participation in the arbitration
procedure estopped plaintiff from contesting the decision, the court held that objections relating to
arbitration are preserved pursuant to § 572.19 of the Minnesota Statutes. Rosenberger, 309 N.W.2d at
309.
52. See In re Discharge ofJohnson, 288 Minn. 300, 180 N.W.2d 184 (1970). In Johnson, the court
stated it was of the opinion that:
JB]y the enactment of the Public Employees Relations Act, the legislature has
established as a matter of public policy the only way in which an employee of a village
may assert a grievance against the latter. The legislature has not authorized a village
under these circumstances to delegate its legislative authority, and hence the
arbitration board exceeded its powers in making the award which had been filed
herein.
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that the marital dissolution statute prescribes an exclusive method
for dissolving marriages. 
53
In New York, where many of the very few American judicial
decisions on family law arbitration have arisen, 54 appellate courts
have consistently approved the arbitration of alimony, child
support, and property issues 55 and have waffled on the arbitration
of custody and visitation. The first department of New York's
Appellate Division, for example, decided in Sheets v. Sheets, 56 a 1964
case, that custody issues could be arbitrated, but the court reserved
the power to set aside the custody decision in the interest of the
child. The court of appeals subsequently cited Sheets with
enthusiastic approval. 57 However, the second department of the
appellate division continues to hold that agreements to arbitrate the
custody of minor children are inappropriate.5 8 As of January 1985,
the court of appeals had not resolved the differences between the
two appellate departments, either because no case presented itself
or, more likely, because the court of appeals deems the two lines of
decisions reconcilable by the residual power of the trial courts to
review any arbitrated custody decision. 59
At the turn of the century, Kentucky, 60 and more recently
Id. at 304-05, 180 N.W.2d at 187. See also, Public Employees Labor Relations Act, ch. 839 § 3, 1965
Minn. Laws 1557 (providing methods for conciliation of labor disputes involving public employees),
repealed by Public Employees Labor Relations Act of 1971, ch. 33 § 17, 1971 Extra Sess. Minn. Laws
2733. Minnesota now provides a procedure for negotiation, mediation, and arbitration in labor
disputes involving public employees. See MINN. STAT. §§ 179A. 14 to 179A. 16 (Supp. 1985).
53. Compare Public Employees Labor Relations Act, ch. 839 S 3, 1965 Minn. Laws 1557
(providing methods for conciliation of labor disputes involving public employees), repealed by Public
Employees Labor Relations Act of 1971, ch. 33 § 17, 1971 Extra Sess. Minn. Laws 2733 with MINN.
STAT. § 518.07 (1984) (venue for dissolution or legal separation proceedings).
54. See generally Spencer & Zammit, supra note 14, at 920.
55. See, e.g., Robinson v. Robinson, 296 N.Y. 778, 71 N.E.2d 214 (1947); Sokolsky v. Sokolsky,
59 A.D.2d 600, 398 N.Y.S.2d 161 (1977); Grien v. Grien, 51 A.D.2d 543, 378 N.Y.S.2d 621 (1976).
56. 22 A.D.2d 176, 254 N.Y.S.2d 320 (1964).
57. See Schneider v. Schneider, 17 N.Y.2d 123, 246 N.E.2d 318, 269 N.Y.S.2d 107 (1966). In
Schneider, the court of appeals quoted at length from Sheets and described that case as "a thorough and
convincing opinion." Id. at ___, 216 N.E.2d at 309-11,269 N.Y.S.2d at 109.
58. See Nestel v. Nestel, 38 A.D.2d 942, 331 N.Y.S.2d 241 (1972); Agur v. Agur, 32 A.D.2d 16,
298 N.Y.S.2d 772 (1969), appeal dismissed, 27 N.Y.2d 643, 313 N.Y.S.2d 866, 261 N.E.2d 903
(1970).
59. The slight shift of the second appellate department in 1979 supports the view that the two
lines of decision are reconcilable. See State ex rel. Bruzzese v. Bruzzese, 70 A.D.2d 957, 417
N.Y.S.2d 763 (1979). In Bruzzese the court held that "it is axiomatic that an agreement as to custody
may be upheld only after the agreement is subjected to the closest and most careful scrutiny and then
only jenforcement of the Idecision] is in the best interest . .. of the children .... " Id. at _ , 417
N.Y.S.2d at 765 (emphasis in original). Beneath all of the qualifications lies an acknowledgment ot
the validity of arbitration of custody agreements. Acceptance of the reconcilability of the two
departments' decisions may have been signaled when Justice Breitel stated: "[I]n custody matters,
courts will review the actions of arbitrators notwithstanding an agreement between the parents to
settle the custody matter by arbitration . . . Port Washington Union Free Dist. v. Port
Washington Teachers Ass'n, 45 N.Y.2d 411, -, 380 N.E.2d 280, 285, 408 N.Y.S.2d 453, 458
(1978) (Breitel, J., concurring).
60. See Masterson v. Masterson, 33 Ky. L. Rptr. 1193, 60 S.W. 301 (1901) (award of alimony
resulting from arbitration is enforceable).
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Delaware, 61 have upheld the arbitration of monetary issues in
divorce. But the one reported case in New Jersey unequivocally
found that neither custody nor child support was arbitrable there.
62
Similarly, Louisiana does not permit the arbitration of custody
matters. 63  And Wisconsin's Supreme Court, in language
reminiscent of early twentieth-century case law that struck down
arbitration in commercial litigation, views the arbitration of any
family law matter as a usurpation of judicial power. 64 Evidently,
no other American jurisdiction is currently using or considering
arbitration in family law disputes.
65
All of the court-annexed experiments in arbitration have been
with mandatory nonbinding agreements. Although Michigan,
Pennsylvania, Ohio, and New York have imposed financial
disincentives for appealing arbitration awards, all of them permit a
trial de novo on the merits if the nonprevailing party demands it.6
6
Accordingly, even if those jurisdictions that have programs for
mandatory nonbinding arbitration of civil cases extended the
programs to family law matters, the question of the validity of
arbitration might never arise because the programs are
nonbinding.
Except in New York, litigation of the validity of the arbitration
of family law matters when the parties voluntarily consent to be
bound has been infrequent. In the New York cases, the parties,
generally observant Roman Catholics and Orthodox Jews, had
voluntarily submitted their custody disputes to binding arbitration
by a co-religionist because they were concerned about the religious
upbringing of their children when the noncustodial parent would
have little or no postdecretal control. In each case the attorney for
61. DuPont v. DuPont, 40 Del. Ch. 290, 181 A.2d 95 (1962) (agreement to arbitrate disputes
involving education of children following separation is enforceable).
62. Wertlake v. Wertlake, 127 N.J. Super. 595, __, 318 A.2d 446, 448 (Ch. Div. 1974). In
Werlake, the court noted that other jurisdictions uphold arbitration agreements involving alimony,
support, custody, and visitation, yet declared that arbitration is ill-adapted for the delicate balancing
of the factors imposing the best interest of the child. Id. at __, 318 A.2d at 447-48. Concluding that
custody and visitation questions are not subject to arbitration, the court stated: "Since the State is
parens patriae to children, and since the support, education and welfare of children is the exclusive
concern of the courts so that parties can make no permanent binding contract with respect to those
matters, child support is not arbitrable." Id. at __, 318 A.2d at 448 (citing A. LINDEY, SEPARATION
AGREEMENTS AND ANTE-NuPTIAL CONTRACTS § 29-14 (1967)).
63. See Stone v, Stone, 292 So. 2d 686, 691 (La. 1974) (dicta); George Engine Co. v. Southern
Shipbldg. Corp., 350 So. 2d 881, 887 (La. 1977) (dicta).
64. See Bliwas v. Bliwas, 47 Wis. 2d 635, 178 N.W.2d 35 (1970). In Bliwas, the court stated that
spouses may not make any postnuptial agreements that "proscribe, modify, or oust the court of its
power to determine the disposition of property, alimony, support, custody, or other manners .
Id. at 639, 178 N.W.2d at 37.
65. J. Hagemeyer, State-by-State Survey of the Use of Arbitration/Mediation of Family Law
Disputes (1983) (unpublished manuscript) (compiled for the Minnesota State Bar Association Family
Law Section's Arbitration and Mediation Committee).
66. Dosal, supra note 37, at 36-37.
[VOL. 61:263274
MEDIATION
the nonprevailing party contended on appeal that the arbitration
process itself was unlawful. If the Ramsey County, Minnesota
judges had promulgated a plan for voluntary binding arbitration,
the Minnesota appellate courts would have had to address the
question of the validity of arbitration.
B. DESIRABILITY OF ARBITRATING DISSOLUTIONS
The advantages of arbitration are the privacy and informality
of the proceedings, the malleability of procedures, the availability
of a wide variety of remedies, the flexibility in the choice of forum,
and the rapidity of obtaining a decision. 67 But arbitration has some
decided disadvantages as well. For those unsatisfied with the
arbitration result, a trial de novo combined with arbitration will
increase time and costs. To the extent that there may be hidden
assets, extensive discovery will increase formality, whereas relying
on unsworn documents may raise ethical problems about
safeguarding a client's interests. 68 Lastly, for those disputants to
whom autonomy is the salient criterion, an arbitrator is as much an
outside decision-maker as a referee or a judge. Some couples -
those who highly value informality, speed, and confidentiality, but
still desire an impartial umpire - are likely to choose arbitration.
But the alternative dispute resolution method most likely to elicit
popular support is mediation.
IV. MEDIATION
A. WHAT MEDIATION IS AND Is NOT
Arbitration and negotiation by attorneys are similar to
litigation. 69 Arbitration is adjudication with a private judge, and
negotiation entails two advocates, each seeking to make as few
concessions as possible while bargaining within a framework of the
court's likely decision in the event of trial. Mediation, though, is
conceptually distinct.
67. One study showed a drop in case delay in Philadelphia from 84 months to 48 months, and in
the state of Washington from 12 months to 60 days, owing to the arbitration of civil disputes. J.
Pearson, supra note 34, at 30.
68. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 6-4 (1979). Ethical Consideration 6-4
provides in part as follows: "Having undertaken representation, a lawyer should use proper care to
safeguard the interests of his client.... In addition to being qualified to handle a particular matter,
his obligation to his client requires him to prepare adequately for and give appropriate attention to
his legal work." Id. See also MODE RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.1 (1983). Rule 1.1 ofthe
Model Rules of Professional Conduct provides as follows: "A lawyer shall provide competent
representation to a client. Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill,
thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation." Id.
69. See Riskin, Mediation in the Law Schools, J. LEGAL EDUC., 259, 259 (1984).
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One of the clearest definitions of mediation is Kenneth
Rigby's: "[M]ediation is a process to facilitate clarification of the
issues, identify alternatives, reduce acrimony existing between the
parties, assist the parties in resolving any controversy, and help the
parties reach a mutual agreement."70
Unlike therapy, mediation is task-oriented. Unlike
adjudication, mediation avoids assignment of blame. Unlike
attorney-negotiated settlements, mediation does not require an
adversarial protection of the client's turf. And, unlike all three,
mediation discourages dependency upon professionals.
71
B. HISTORY OF MEDIATION
We are just now beginning the second decade of mediation of
family disputes, but the idea of mediation is quite venerable. The
Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service (FMCS) has been
operating in the labor relations arena since 1947, and before that,
various groups, particularly the Chinese-Americans, Mormons,
Quakers, and Jews, established mediational institutions to resolve
disputes within their respective groups. 72 We can trace mediation
in legal history back almost eight hundred years. The Magna Carta
itself is the product of a truce mediated by Archbishop of
Canterbury Stephen Langton on the meadow of Runnymede in
1215 between King John and the barons of England.
73
Experimentation with custody mediation began in the public
sector in 1973 in Los Angeles County, California; Dane County
(Madison), Wisconsin; and Hennepin County (Minneapolis),
Minnesota. 74 Mediation received a big boost at the 1976 Pound
Conference on the Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the
Administration of Justice, where Chief Justice Warren Burger
endorsed the idea of alternative dispute resolution techniques.
75
70. Rigby, supra note 18, at 1743.
71. See generally Fuller, Mediation, 44 S. CAL. L. REv. 305, 314-15 (1971); Folberg, supra note 9,
at 13; Pearson, Child Custody: Why Not Let the Parents Decide?, JuDcEsJ., Winter 1981, at 4, 4.
72. Brown, supra note ?, at 1-2.
73. See L. WRIGHT, MAGNA CARTA AND THE TRADITION OF LIBERTY, 32-35 (1976).
74. Mclsaac, Mandatory Conciliation Custody/Visitation Matters: California's Bold Stroke, CONCIL-
IATION CTS. R., Dec. 1981, at 73, 73.
75. Address by Chief Justice Burger, National Conference on the Causes of Popular Dis-
satisfaction with the Administration ofJustice (April 7, 1976), reprinted in 70 F.R.D. 83, 85 (1976).
ChiefJustice Burger stated as follows:
It may be worth more than a footnote, and help us to gain perspective, to
remember that when Pound spoke in this chamber many of the audience came from
the downtown hotel by trolly cars that had just replaced the horsecars, and some
perhaps came by horse and buggy. Where the parking meters now stand were hitching
posts for horses. The horses and buggies are gone - even the trolley cars are gone -
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The Conference spawned a task force chaired by Attorney General
Griffin Bell, which in turn generated the federally-funded
Neighborhood Justice Centers experiment. 76 This exploration all
occurred in what Steven Zwickel calls the "early Bronze Age of
Mediation. "7
Today there are some 180 alternative dispute resolution
programs (mostly mediation) in the United States and some 300
divorce mediation services. 78 Many of these programs are intended
to resolve neighborhood disputes, landlord-tenant quarrels, bad
check cases, and parent-teenager conflicts. Other programs are
criminal diversion variants which involve the victims as well as the
perpetrators. They have a variety of names, but the most common
are Community Justice Centers, Night Prosecutor's Mediation
Programs, and Neighborhood Justice Centers. 79  Mediation
,programs flourish in Scotland, 0 in Windsor, Ontario,81 and in
'New South Wales, Australia.8 2 Many programs like the Mediation
Center for Dispute Resolution, a nonprofit organization in
Minneapolis, encompass mediation of family disputes as well as of
criminal, neighborhood, juvenile, and small claims matters.
C. ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF PROGRAMS MEDIATING
FAMILY DISPUTES
Mediation programs take a variety of forms. Some are
university-connected, such as the one at the University of
Massachusetts, which integrates workshops, research, the
undergraduate law program, and actual mediation. It embraces
both family matters and nonfamily matters such as fraternity
disputes, internal employee union conflicts, business dissolutions,
and sex harassment cases. 83
and men like Henry Ford, Louis Chevrolet, and the Wright Brothers have altered our
lives dramatically. Yet we see that, fundamentally, the methods for settling disputes
remain essentially what they were in that day.
Perhaps what we need now are some imaginative Wright Brothers of the law to
invent, and Henry Fords of the law to perfect, new machinery for resolving disputes.
Id.
76. J. Pearson, supra note 34, at 7.
77. Alternative Dispute Resolution: Who's In Charge of Mediation?, Discussion Series, Topic 2 - 1982,
ABA Special Committee on Alternative Means of Dispute Resolution, 51 (panel discussion, Jan. 21,
1982) [hereinafter cited as Topic 2].
78. J. Pearson, supra note 34, at 8.
79. Alternative Dispute Resolution: Bane or Boon to Attorneys?, Discussion Series, Topic 1 - 1982, ABA
Special Committee on Alternative Means of Dispute Resolution, i (panel discussion, Aug. 11, 1981)
[hereinafter cited as Topic 11.
80. Id. at 55-56 (statement byJ. Falsgraf).
81. Id. at 15 (statement by R. Weiss).
82. W. Faulkes, Mediation - Australian Style (June 1983) (materials submitted for the National
Institutefor Family Dispute Resolution Conference, Los Angeles).
83. Topic 2, supra note 77, at 58-64 (statement by.J. Rifkin).
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The Northwest Mediation Service is a non-profit organization
in Seattle, which uses male-female mediation teams comprised of
one attorney and one therapist. Twelve independent contractors -
six lawyers and six therapists - constitute their staff. They report a
success rate of between eighty to ninety percent and aver that their
least successful couples are those referred to them by the King
County Court under Washington's mandatory mediation
program. 
8 4
Another nonprofit organization, the Christian Legal Society
(CLS) in Albuquerque, New Mexico, offers a choice of arbitration
or mediation. Its cases include both commercial and domestic
matters. Because of their religious connection, the CLS mediators
and arbitrators believe they can provide remedies unavailable in
court, such as those relating to celebrations, covenantal
relationship remedies, dinners, and worship services. 8 5
Court-connected mediation programs of family disputes have
expanded beyond Los Angeles, Madison, and Minneapolis.
Occasionally, they have been effectuated by administrative order of
the court (e.g., Broward County, Florida), 6 but more often by
statute. California, for example, enacted in 1980 a law requiring
mediation in all custody cases. 87 By procedures promulgated by the
family court, custody mediation is an option in Hawaii and Washoe
County (Reno), Nevada. 88 In Minnesota, custody disputes in
Olmstead County (Rochester) are referred to mediation by
informal agreement of the bench and family law bar; 89 in the Twin
Cities metropolitan area, Anoka, Washington, Dakota, and
Ramsey Counties have all followed the lead of Hennepin County in
making custody mediation available, even though there is no clear
authority to do so. They evidently rely on a broad construction of
the Minnesota statute authorizing welfare "investigations" in
custody matters. 90
No one knows the actual number of private mediation services
because there is no national registry and no licensing requirement
84. N. Kaplan, Access to Affordable Services: The Role of Private Mediation, 4, 7 (June 1983)
(materials submitted for the National Institute for Family Dispute Resolution Conference, Los Angeles).
85. Topic 2, supra note 77, at 50 (statement by L. Buzzard).
86. Admin. Order No. 79-25, 17thJud. Cir., Broward County Fla. (Oct. 5, 1979).
87. SeeCAL. CIv. CODE § 4607 (effectiveJan. 1, 1981).
88. Comeaux, Procedural Controls in Public Sector Domestic Relations Mediation in ALTERNATIVE
MEANS OF FAMILY DISPUTE RESOLUTION, 79, 85 & n. 59 (1982).
89. Interview with Larry Downing, Fourth Annual Family Law Institute, Bloomington, Minn.
(March I1, 1983).
90. Memorandum ofR. Wycoff, former Director of Hennepin County Court Services (April 28,
1980) (explaining Hennepin County's reliance on the authority implied in S 518.167 of the
Minnesota Statutes). See also MINN. STAT. § 518. 167(1) (1984), Section 518.167(1) of the Minnesota
Statutes provides as follows:
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for mediators. Only a fraction of the private mediators are formally
affiliated with either of the two national family mediation service
groups: the Family Mediation Association and the Academy of
Family Mediators. The Minnesota Mediation Council, for
example, is affiliated with the Academy of Family Mediators, 91 but
the Illinois Mediation Council is not.
92
D. BENEFITS OF MEDIATION
Perhaps the chief advantage of mediation over the adversarial
method of dispute resolution is that stated by Leonard Riskin:
"Mediation tends to heal wounds, not just pay for the
bandages."93 Additional advantages most concisely and oft-stated
by mediation advocates include the following:
1. Mediation opens communication between the
divorcing parties.
2. Parties make their own agreements instead of having
settlements imposed upon them by a third party.
3. The peaceful solution of conflicts helps to prevent
problems from escalating.
4. The mediation process takes problems out of the
adversarial win-lose setting of the court into a setting
which is non-adversarial and neutral.
5. Solutions reached through mediation last longer
because these solutions represent the views of both
parties and are perceived as fair and acceptable over
time.
6. Mediation is less expensive and quicker than court
processing, especially of minor disputes.
7. Mediation helps the spouses identify the issues,
reduce misunderstandings, vent emotions, clarify
positions, find points of agreement, explore new areas
of compromise, and ultimately negotiate an
agreement.
In contested custody proceedings, and in other custody proceedings ifa parent or
(he child's custodian requests, the court may order an investigation and report
concerning custodial arrangements for the child. The investigation and report may be
made by the county welfare agency or department of court services.
I.
91. Telephone interview with Steven Erickson, President of the Minnesota Council of Family
Mediators (Feb. 25, 1986).
92. Interview with Lee Howard, President ofthe Illinois Mediation Council (Dec. 19, 1984).
93. Riskin, supra note 69, at 261.
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8. Mediation is conducted in private.
9. Mediation permits the airing of all grievances, not
only those that are legally operative.
10. It is procedurally simple and more likely to lead to
truth finding.
11. It is capable of dealing with the causes of problems,
not just the problems.
12. It reduces the alienation of the litigants and opens
communication between them.
13. It aids disputing parties in resuming workable
relationships with each other.
14. It enhances the adjustment of children following
separation or divorce by promoting parental
cooperation, reinforcing parent-child bonds and
encouraging visitation.
15. It reduces the anger, feelings of loss, sense of injustice
and separation from their children that many non-
custodial parents experience.
16. It promotes child support payment performance of
fathers following divorce.
17. It reduces governmental interference in the ordering
of marital and family affairs.
18. It diminishes the emphasis of fault-finding and
blameworthiness. 
94
E. PROBLEMS WITH MEDIATION?
A survey of the literature of mediation indicates a list of
criticisms of mediated divorces, all of which need to be analyzed
and discussed. 
9 5
1. Lack of Protection
Critics fear that mediation carries a high risk that the parties
will enter into enforceable contracts without full information about
94. Rigby, supra note 18, at 1744 (citing Bahr, Mediation is theAnswer, 3 FAM. Anvoc. 32 (1981));
Bartcau, How to Create a Conciliation Court, 2 FAM. ADVOC. 6 (1980); Crouch, Divorce Mediation and
Legal Ethics, 16 FAM. L.Q. 219 (1982); Gaughan, Taking a Fresh Look at Divorce Mediation, 17 TRIAL 39
(1981); Pearson & Thoennes, Mediation and Divorce: The Benefits Outweigh the Cost, 4 FAsM. Anvoc. 26
(1982); Silberman, Professional Responsibility Problems of Divorce Mediation, 16 FAM. L.Q. 107, 108,
(1982); Winks, Divorce Mediation: A Nonadversary Procedure for the No-Fault Divorce, 19J. FAM. L. 615,
634-35 (1981)).
95. See Crouch, The Dark Side of Mediation, FAM. ADVOC., Winter 1982, at 27-33; Topic 1, supra




legal rights. This was a valid criticism in the original divorce
mediation model developed by Coogler 96 which called for one
"advisory attorney." But virtually all mediation programs,
certainly all operating in Minnesota, have abandoned that model
and strongly encourage, if not insist, that each mediating disputant
retain his or her own counsel.
2. Bureaucratization
If mediation expands in the public sector, critics worry it will
surely prompt the creation of a vast, new bureaucracy - civil
service ratings, job descriptions, procedure manuals, and
certification boards. Bureaucratization is, it seems, an inevitable
concomitant of government programs, no matter how innovative
they are initially. The bureaucratization argument is one of the
most well-aimed arrows in the quivers of those who argue for
private sector mediation.
3. Economic Threat
Some attorneys fear that successful mediations in the private
sector may reduce clientele for the family law bar. If mediation is
carried out in the public and nonprofit sectors, they argue, private
attorneys may be obliged to subsidize their competition through
taxes, which provide funds for government grants, and through
donations to the United Way, whose grantees may also provide
such services.
In point of fact, despite the growing popularity of mediation,
there will be no shortage of clients who desire to resolve their
marital disputes through traditional litigation or attorney
negotiation. Those clients who do mediate their divorces will
continue to need attorneys to advise them throughout the
mediation process, to help with informal "discovery" of
information, to provide asset valuation, and to draft settlement
agreements with the concomitant tax and estate planning. Some
attorneys may undergo training and become part-time mediators.
Judge Frank Orlando of Ft. Lauderdale, who pioneered court-
connected mediation in Florida, says that many Florida attorneys
96. See 0. COOGLER, STRUCTURED MEDIATION IN DIVORCE SETTLEMENT 27-28 (1978). Coogler
explains that mediation involving an impartial, advisory attorney results in an agreement that can be
better understood and followed by the parties. Id. at 27. Moreover, advisory attorneys often "add a
significant number of provisions, called 'boilerplate,' which were never considered by either the
mediator or the parties, but which are designed to facilitate the postdivorce relationship between the
parties and reinforce the soecific agreements actually reached." Id. at 28.
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worked against the proposed legislation authorizing mediation in
Florida counties. 97 He pointed out, however, that attorneys in
jurisdictions with actual mediation experience - in California,
Oregon, and Arizona - now account for a majority of the
mediation referrals. 9
8
4. Risk of Dominance
It is likely that one member of the divorcing couple is more
powerful, more knowledgeable, and has more resources. Critics
fear that the goals of mediation are neither plausible nor likely to be
achieved with such inequality of bargaining power. This is a serious
issue in mediation. Mental health professionals have explained
that, in addition to power and financial disparities, there are
important emotional differences that affect the risk of dominance in
mediation. Invariably, the initiator of the divorce experiences the
emotional stages of dissolution (denial, anger, blame, loss, grief,
helplessness, guilt, failure) before the noninitiator does. 99
97. Orlando, Where and How - Conciliation Courts in ALTERNATIVE MEANS OF FAMILY DISPUTE
RESOLUTION 111, 119 (1982).
98. Id. Judge Orlando noted that many lawyers initially worked against the institution of a
state-funded mediation program, but went on to state that "Iwlith the passage of time, more and
more lawyers have seen the positive benefits that working with the program can have, especially
when they see how well our mediators can defuse a highly emotional custody or visitation dispute."
Id. at 119. Pointing out the similarities between the Florida experience and that of other jurisdictions
utilizing court counseling and mediation programsJudge Orlando went on to state:
Attorneys in Arizona, California and Oregon seem to agree, since 55 to 65% of all
referrals to court counseling in those states come from attorneys. In Fort Lauderdale,
the first year we had our program, less than 5% of our cases were attorney referred. In
the third year of the program, we are up to 30% and are increasing monthly.
Id. at 120.
99. See, e.g., Brown, The Emotional Context of Divorce: Implications Jor Mediation, in ALTERNATIVE
MEANS OF FAMILY DISPUTE RESOLUTION, 43, 43-49 (1982). Emily Brown tells us that:
Each spouse goes through a very distinct emotional process in coming to terms
with the end of the marriage. Although the process is somewhat similar for the initiator
and the non-initiator, the two spouses are out of phase with each other. The initiator,
who is in control of the timing of the separation, has also had the opportunity to do
much of the "grief work" prior to the separation. This involves coining to terms with
the loss of one's hopes for the relationship, as well as the loss of the relationship itself.
Feelings of anger, guilt, and helplessness predominate during the grief process, and it
is difficult to attend to anything else.
The non-initiator spends the time prior to separation denying the impending
separation or trying to find ways to prevent it. While the initiator often finds some
relief in the separation, the non-initiator is hit with a "double-whammy." This person
must deal with all the logistical and economic changes accruing from separation and
must also begin dealing with rejection and grief. The non-initiator who is having
difficulty accepting the reality of the separation, may comment that "she'll come to
her senses," "she really doesn't mean this," or "he's always come back before, so I'll
just wait him out." Once the non-initiator acknowledges the separation, that person
begins grieving (or occasionally denies the grief for a time and later falls apart).
Id. at 43-44.
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Depending upon the emotional stage each disputant is experiencing
during the mediation, it is possible that the spouse who is
temporarily the most "risk-averse" may make concessions he or
she will later regret. 100
Some feminists have also voiced doubts about the power
redistribution in mediation and about mediation's growing
popularity at the very time that women have demonstrated their
ability to do well in the adversary system. A banner displayed at
the April 1983, National Conference on Women in the Law in
Washington, D.C., stated: "Mediation Hurts Women;" and
NOW's Legal Defense Fund has prepared a Feminists' Consumer
Guide to Mediation, published in the fall of 1983, warning women to
be wary of divorce mediation. 101
Similarly, in the spring of 1983, the Battered Women's
Advocates Caucus of the 14th National Conference on Women and
the Law adopted a resolution which, inter alia, declared that
"[m]ediation is always inappropriate with respect to any issue (be it
related to violence or not) where there has been any act or threat of
violence against a woman or child."
0 2
On the other hand, more recent feminist commentary on
mediation suggests that, unlike the adversarial system that
reinforces patterns of domination by the lawyer-client relationship,
mediation focuses on female concerns of responsibility and justice
and enabling people to decide for themselves instead of "helping
people by deciding for them.' 0 3 While most experienced
mediators assert that one of the mediator's roles is to equalize the
power imbalance, the real hedge against that risk will be the
involvement of the attorneys retained by the disputants.
5. Incompetence
Without standards, training requirements, or licensure,
anyone can call himself or herself a mediator and may harm people
going through the emotional trauma of divorce. The absence of
universally accepted standards has been a concern of everyone
100. See Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 18, at 971. A "risk-averse" party, for example,
would be "[a] parent who would accept an outcome of less than half-custody in order to avoi4 the
gamble - the chance of losing the coin fltp, and receiving no custody.... T
101. G. Scott, Can the Starrlet Become a Class Act?, 7 (June 1983) (materials submitted for the
National InstituteJor Family Dispute Resolution Conference, Los Angeles).
102. Res. 1, Battered Women's Advocates Caucus, 14th Nat'l Conf. on Women and the Law
(Washington, D.C. Apr. 10, 1983).
103. Rifkin, Mediation From a Feminist Perspective. Promise and Problems, 2 LAW AND INEQUALITY 21,
21-31, 25 n. 21 (1984).
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involved in the mediation movement. There is little agreement,
however, on who should formulate the standards for mediators and
whom those standards should exclude. Should mediators, for
example, be licensed or accredited? Should there be a minimal
amount of training, and, if so, who should certify the quality of the
training upon which a would-be mediator relies in hanging out her
or his shingle? Must mediators have either a law degree, a
doctorate in psychology, or a masters in social work - or can
laypersons with the right skills, instincts, and training be mediators
despite the lack of academic credentials?
In 1984 two national organizations, the Association of Family
and Conciliation Courts (AFCC) and the American Bar
Association (ABA) each adopted a set of model standards of
practice for mediators in family disputes. 10 4 Both sets of model
standards address such issues as impartiality, unequal negotiating
ability, full disclosure of assets, guidelines for initiating mediation,
advice to the parties to seek independent counsel, confidentiality,
conflict of interest, fees, and ex parte communication. Both mention
that mediators should be qualified by experience and training, and
the AFCC standards admonish mediators to participate in
continuing education. Neither sets forth detailed criteria for
mediator education and training.
The Academy of Family Mediators (a national organization of
mediators) and the Mediation Center for Dispute Resolution (a
Minnesota nonprofit organization) have each developed similar,
yet distinct criteria for professional credentials and mediation-
focused training. The Academy's standards are binding on
members of the Academy, and the Mediation Center's standards
are required of those who apply to mediate family law matters
through the auspices of the Center. 1
05
6. False Promises
Critics allege that mediation is not faster or less expensive than
conventional dissolution methods. Some promoters of mediation
104. The AFCC model standards were developed in consultation with some 30 other
organizations, including the American Psychological Association, the National Institute for Dispute
Resolution, and the American Arbitration Association. See Model Standards of Practice for Family and
Divorce Mediation, ARBITRATION TsItES, Fall 1984, at 45. The ABA standards, drafted by the
Mediation Task Force of its family law section, were formally approved by the ABA House of
Delegates on August 8, 1984. See Standards of Practicefor Lawyer Mediators in Family Disputes, 18 FAM. L.
Q. 363 (1984) (presentation of standards).
105. See Academy of Family Mediators, Standards for Membership 4-5 (1985); Memorandum from
John Wolf to the Divorce Mediation Committee of the Mediation Center for Dispute Resolution,
Dec. 6, 1983 (standards for Mediation Center Family and Divorce Mediator Panels).
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have exaggerated its virtues. We now, however, have some
rigorous research that supports the contention that mediation is
more durable and satisfying to the disputants, even if it is not
necessarily faster or less expensive than the adversarial model. The
initial findings of the Divorce Mediation Research Project, co-
sponsored by the Colorado Bar Association and the Piton
Foundation, are as follows:
- eighty percent of those who mediated produce
agreements (either during or after mediation)
compared to fifty percent of those who never mediated;
- sixty-six percent of ex-spouses who successfully
mediated report that the other spouse complies with the
agreement compared to between thirty to forty-five
percent of those whose attorneys negotiated
stipulations or who went to trial;
- more than two-thirds of successfully mediated
individuals were "highly satisfied" with the results;
- eighty-one percent of the mediation drop-outs were
sufficiently satisfied with mediation, despite their
failure, to recommend it to friends; only fifty-six
percent of those who did not attempt mediation were
satisfied with the terms of their final orders;
- thirteen percent of the couples who successfully
mediated reported serious postdecretal problems
compared to thirty to forty percent of both mediation
drop-outs and those in the control group (who were
never offered mediation). 1
06
The research indicates that there were some, but not
significant, monetary savings to those completing mediation. 0 7
Another research project, in Fairfax County, Virginia, yielded
similar results - relatively insignificant financial savings but
impressively high user satisfaction. 108
The Colorado research includes a second round of follow-up
interviews, which indicate that mediated agreements are much
more durable; six percent of the mediated agreements generated
106. Pearson & Thoennes, Divorce Mediation: Strengths and Weaknesses over Time, in ALTERNATIVE
MEANS OF FAMILY DISPUTE RESOLUTIONS 51, 57-59 (1982). See alsoJ. Pearson, supra note 34, at 20-30
(empirical findings on the satisfaction and success of mediation programs).
107. Pearson & Thonnes, supra note 106, at 62.
108. See Bahr, Mediation is the Answer, FAM. ADVOC., Spring 1981, at 32, 34-35. A study
cond ucted in Fairfax County, Virginia determined a mean divorce cost of $2,423 per couple in non-
mediated cases, while couples using private mediation services paid an average of $1,858 for a
completed divorce. Id. at 34 & Table 1.
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serious disagreements between the parties compared to thirty-three
percent of the litigated and negotiated dissolution decrees. 10 9 The
follow-up research also showed, however, that the mediation drop-
outs were just as fractious as the nonmediated divorce couples,
indicating that for those who leave mediation, the process is more
costly and may only defer the postdecretal problems.110
7. Self-interest
Critics believe that mediators will urge any settlement rather
than a fair- settlement because they have a stake in the success of
mediation. Mediators must guard against the tendency to suggest
compromises where compromise will be unfair to one party. In
properly conducted mediations, though, the parties and not the
mediator make all of the decisions. The real safeguard must come
from the disputants' separate attorneys, who should be involved
early in the mediation process.
8. Checks and Balances
Critics argue that mediation lacks the checks and balances of
the adversary system.'1 ' Further, where advocate-lawyers are
involved, they are made to feel like "spoil-sports" if they suggest
changes in the mediation agreement. The Coogler divorce
mediation model lacked a system of checks and balances;'
t 2
however, the post-Coogler model demands the hiring of separate
private counsel. 13 Feedback from the family law bar has prompted
Minnesota mediators to insist on attorneys' early involvement to
promote checks and balances within mediation.
9. Ethical Problems
Ethical issues account for a substantial portion of writing,
109.J. Pearson, supra note 34, at 27. Pearson noted:
[A]t a long-term follow-up interview, 79% of successful mediation clients reported
their spouse to be in compliance with the child and financial terms of the agreement
and this was reported by 67% of adversarial respondents. While 33% of adversarial
respondents reported that serious disagreements had arisen over the settlement, this
was noted by only 6% of successful mediation clients.
Id
110. Pearson & Thoennes, supra note 106, at 64-65.
111. SeeJ. Pearson, supra note 34, at 39.
112. See generally 0. COOGLER, supra note 96 (presenting an early divorce mediation model).
113. See Crouch, Mediation and Divorce: the Dark Side is Still Unexplored, 4 FAM. ADVOC. 27, 33-35
(1982); Brown, supra note 7, at 23,
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lectures, and conversation among mediators. The salient ethical
problems comprise two major issues and a number of minor ones.
a. conflict of interest
Though it is beyond dispute that an attorney may not
represent both spouses in a contested dissolution action, 114 it is
uncertain whether a lawyer-mediator violates professional
obligations by providing legal information in a mediation session.
Although bar associations in some states, particularly
Washington, New Hampshire, and Maryland, have found ethical
violations, the trend, represented by New York, Massachusettes,
Oregon, and West Virginia, is the 'other way. 115 Those bar
associations in the developing majority have determined that
mediation is not the practice of law and that mediators do not
represent either party in a mediation. Rule 2.2 of the Minnesota
Rules of Professional Conduct authorizes an attorney to serve as
114. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-105 (1974). Disciplinary Rule 5-
105 provides in part as follows:
(A) A lawyer shall decline proffered employment if the exercise of his independent
professional judgment in behalfofa client will be or is likely to be adversely affected by
the acceptance of the proffered employment, or if it would be likely to involve him in
representing differing interests, except to the extent permitted under DR 5-105(C).
(C) In the situation covered by DR 5-105(A) and (B), a lawyer may represent multiple
clients if it is obvious that he can adequately represent the interest of each and if each
consents to the representation after full disclosure of the possible effect of such
representation on the exercise of his independent professional judgment on behalf of
each.
Id. See also MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7 (1983). Rule 1.7 of the Model Rules
provides as follows:
(a) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that client will be
directly adverse to another client, unless:
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not adversely
affect the relationship with the other client; and
(2) each client consents after consultation.
(b) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that client may be
materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client or to a third person,
or by the lawyer's own interests, unless:
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not be adversely
affected; and
(2) the client consents after consultation. When representation of multiple
clients in a single matter is undertaken, the consultation shall include
explanation of the implications of the common representation and the
advantages and risks involved.
Id.
115. See Wash. S.B.A. Prof. Resp. Comm. Informal Op. Item 385 (1980); N.H.S.B.A. Ethics
Comm. (April 27, 1981) (proposed opinion); Md. S.B.A. Comm. on Ethics, No. 80-55A (1980);
N.Y.S.B.A. Comm. on Prof. Ethics, Op. 258 (1972); Boston B.A. Comm. on Ethics, Op. No. 78-1
(1980); see generally Silbernan, Professional Responsibility Problems of Divorce Mediation, 7 FAM. L. REV.
4001 (1981), reprinted in ALTERNATIVE MEANS OF FAMILY DISPUTE RESOLUTION 239, 244-49 (1982).
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either an arbitrator or a mediator. 116 The attorney may not,
however, represent either party subsequently in the action which
they are presently disputing.1 7 Although Rule 2.2 may not have
contemplated divorce mediation, the Minnesota Professional
Responsibility Board authorizes divorce mediation undertaken by
lawyer-mediators so long as (a) no "advisory attorneys" give
impartial advice during the mediation; (b) disputants mediating
without having retained counsel are referred to bar-sponsored
referral offices; (c) mediators maintain separate mediation and law
offices; and (d) mediators avoid the unauthorized practice of law
during mediation.'" 8
116. See MINNESOTA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 2.2 (1985). Rule 2.2 provides as
follows:
(a) A lawyer may act as intermediary between clients if:
(1) the lawyer consults with each client concerning the implications of the
common representation, including the advantages and risks involved, and the
effect on the attorney-client privileges, and obtains each client's consent to the
common representation;
(2) the lawyer reasonably believes that the matter can be resolved on terms
compatible with the client's best interests, that each client will be able to make
adequately informed decisions in the matter and that there is little risk of
material prejudice to the interests of any of the clients if the contemplated
resolution is unsuccessful; and
(3) the lawyer reasonably believes that the common representation can be
undertaken impartially and without improper effect on other responsibilities
the lawyer has to any of the clients.
(b) While acting as intermediary, the lawyer shall consuh with each client
concerning the decisions to be made and the considerations relevant in making
them, so that each client can make adequately informed decisions.
(c) A lawyer shall withdraw as intermediary if any of the clients so requests, or if
any of the conditions stated in paragraph (a) is no longer satisfied. Upon
withdrawal, the lawyer shall not continue to represent any of the clients in the
matter that was the subject of the intermediation.
Id. The comment to Rule 2.2 states that "[florms of intermediation range from informal arbitration
where each client's case is presented by the respective client and the lawyer decides the outcome, to
mediation, to common representation where the client's interest [sic] are substantially though not
entirely compatible." MINNESOTA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 2.2 comment (1985)
(emphasis added).
117. See MINNESOTA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 2.2(c) (1985); id. Rule 1.12. Rule
1.12 provides in part as follows:
(a) Except as stated in paragraph (d), a lawyer shall not represent anyone in
connection with a matter in which the lawyer participated personally and
substantially as a judge or other adjudicative officer, arbitrator or law clerk to
such a person, unless all parties to the proceedings consent after disclosure.
(c) If a lawyer is disqualified by paragraph (a), no lawyer in a firm with which that
lawyer is associated may knowingly undertake or continue representation in
the matter unless:
(1) the disqualified lawyer is screened from any participation in the matter and
is apportioned no part of the fee therefrom; and
(2) written notice is promptly given to the appropriate tribunal to enable it to
ascertain compliance with the provisions of this rule.
(d) An arbitrator selected as a partisan of a party in a multi-member arbitration
panel is not prohibited from subsequently representing that party.
Id.
118. Letter from Richard S. Reeves, then a staff attorney of the Lawyers Professional
Responsibility Board, to William B. Henschel and Stephen K. Erickson (July 15, 1977).
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b. unauthorized practice of law
Canon 3 of the Code of Professional Responsibility imposes
the obligation upon attorneys to "[alssist in preventing the
unauthorized practice of law." 119 The Disciplinary Rules require
lawyers to refrain from aiding (1) a nonlawyer in the unauthorized
practice of law (DR 3-101); (2) dividing fees with nonlawyers (DR
3-102); and (3) forming partnerships with nonlawyers to carry out
activities comprising the practice of law (DR 3-103). 120
If mediation is defined in a way that makes it separate and
discrete from the practice of law, then many, but not all, of the
questions about the unauthorized practice of law are moot. For
instance, the line between giving legal information and providing
legal advice is exceedingly thin, but marks the frontier between
legitimate activity and unethical conduct. If a mental health
professional co-mediating a divorce with an attorney suggests that
the parties discuss their pensions when enumerating their assets, is
that legal information or legal advice? If it is construed as legal
advice, then the attorney may be assisting a nonlawyer in the
unauthorized practice of law.
Similarly, if the attorney-mediator suggests options to avoid
recapture of alimony tax deductions under the Domestic Relations
Tax Reform Act, is that giving legal advice? If so, it too would run
afoul of the proscription against attorneys practicing law while
conducting mediations.
While some bar associations, like that of New Hampshire,
have apparently decided that it is unethical for attorneys to be
mediators at all, 121 others have viewed the involvement of non
attorneys in mediation as the unauthorized practice of law. 122 The
Stearns County (Minnesota) Bar Association's Family Law
Committee, for example, sent a letter to one of Minnesota's private
mediation services, asserting that its proposed mediation service in
St. Cloud would constitute the unauthorized practice of law.123 On
119. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSI11LITY Canon 3 (1981).
120. Id. DR 3-101, -102, -103 (1981).
121. See New Hampshire Bar Association Ethics Committee, Op. 1983-4/4 (1983). The New
Hampshire Bar Association Ethics Committee has stated that "[a] lawyer may not provide legal
advice to both parties to a divorce action who seek his help through a mediation service. Parties to a
divorce have such differing interests that full disclosure is insufficient to remedy the conflict of
interest." Id.
122. See Ethics Committee of the Board of Professional Responsibility of the Supreme Court of
Tennessee, Op. 83-F-39 (1983). Opinion 83-F-39 declares that "[d]ivorce mediation in which
mediators assist the individuals to reach a mutually acceptable agreement involving the division of
real and personal property, spousal support, child support, child custody and visitation rights
constitutes the practice of law." Id.
123. Letter from Virginia Marso to Karen Irvin (Mar. 10, 1982).
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the other hand, one long-time lawyer-mediator has recently
suggested that a local bar association's interposition of ethical
concerns to artificially restrain mediation services raises serious
antitrust questions. 124
The arrangements of business relations between lawyers and
therapists who co-mediate could also present a problem. The
Oregon Bar Association, which has a very liberal attitude toward
mediation, has indicated that a mediation service could avoid the
fee-splitting problem by formally allocating portions of each fee to
the lawyer and nonlawyer mediators, rather than giving the
impression each is sharing in a single fee.' 25 But to preclude
potential problems in that arena, the Northern California
Mediation Service has created an elaborate structure of a private
nonprofit organization, a for-profit business (neither of which has
any employees), and a consulting firm which acts as an
independent contractor to both organizations and pays its
employee-mediators. 
126
c. other ethical problems
While no ethical issue is really "minor," there are some issues
that have not received as much attention as have conflicts of
interest and the unauthorized practice of law. Most have not been
fully addressed by any bar association, and they are listed here
merely as items for consideration.
1. Is there any such thing as a truly neutrally drafted
instrument - and, if not, can a mediator memorialize
the parties' agreement without advancing the interests
of one over another?
124. Address by Henry Ellson, National Institute for Family Dispute Resolutution Conference, Los
Angeles (June 18, 1983).
125. See SILBERMAN, supra Note 115, at 269-70 (citing Or. B.A. Comm. on Legal Ethics, Pro.
Op., No. 79-46 (1980)). The Oregon Bar Association Committee on Legal Ethics, when asked to
rule on the propriety of a family mediation center comprised of four attorneys and four counselors,
stated:
There seems little question but that fees are split between the attorney and counselor
who comprise a mediation team. However, there is no general pooling of fees for
division by percentage. The actual mediators simply each take a specific amount from
the hourly fee for the particular case in which they participated. In a strict sense the
counselor is not sharing in the direct fruits of the attorney's work, but is being
compensated for his own labor, and vice versa.
Id. at 270. The Committee went on to advise how lawyer and nonlawyer mediators may avoid fee-
splitting problems in the future by declaring that "[the procedure whereby the attorneys and
counselors bill separately for their time helps distinguish between the two professional roles and
removes our concern about fee splitting." Id.
126. Explanation of Joel Shawn, Director of the Northern California Mediation Services,
National Institutefor Family Dispute Resolution Conference, Los Angeles (June 17, 1983).
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2. Should a lawyer-mediator be proscribed from
accepting employment, subsequently, from a party
whose dissolution s/he helped mediate? If not, will
that taint the judgment of such a mediator who is
aware that one of the mediation parties, but not the
other, is likely to require, and has the financial
resources to pay for, legal services in the future?
3. Is an attorney-mediator, when functioning as a
mediator, required to report child abuse under the
child abuse reporting statute if such information is
disclosed during mediation?
127
4. Can an attorney for a client who has "successfully"
mediated his or her dissolution counter-sign a
stipulation in response to the client's request to
"honor the mediation agreement" without bumping
into Canon 5's admonition that "[a] lawyer should
exercise independent professional judgment on behalf
of a client?'
1 28
Some commentators have suggested that the canons of
professional responsibility ought not be made applicable to
mediation since mediation is not the practice of law. Larry
Gaughan, for instance, has suggested fourteen ethical principles for
mediators based on cooperation rather than conflict. 29 "[T]he
127. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. S 625.556 (3) (a) (Supp. 1985). Section 626.556 provides in part:
A professional or his [or her] delegate who is engaged in the practice of the healing
arts, social services, hospital administration, psychological or psychiatric treatment,
child care, education, or law enforcement who has knowledge of or reasonable cause to
believe a child is being neglected or physically or sexually abused shall immediately
report the information to the local welfare agency, police department or the county
sheriff.
Id. (emphasis added).
128. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 5 (1979).
129. Gaughan, An Essay on the Ethics of Separation and Divorce Mediation, in ALTERNATIVE MEANS OF
FAMILY DISPUTE RESOLUTION 321, 327-33, 335 (1982). Larry Gaughan suggests, as the most basic
ethical principles for family mediation by attorneys, the following:
1. An attorney mediator should not mix mediation and law practice in the same case.
2. A lawyer mediator may discuss with a potential client in a preliminary and
impartial way the implications of both mediation and representation.
3. Legal information is not legal advice and may be imparted by the mediator in
proper situations.
4. The mediator should be sure that the parties understand his or her role and the
mediation process.
5. A mediator should be as neutral and impartial as possible.
6. The mediator should avoid secret communications and pressure tactics,
19851
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problem with adversarial divorce settlements," Gaughan has
written, "has been an excessive, rather than insufficient, focus
upon the conflict of interest principle. ' 130 Would-be mediators
must continue to assess this array of ethical questions.
F. ADDITIONAL ISSUES IN FAMILY LAW MEDIATION
1. Who Should Mediate?
Should mediators be attorneys, therapists, or laypersons?
Should mediations be conducted by one person or two? Should
mediators have a minimal amount of training? Should law school
curricula include courses on mediation?
131
The training question encompasses such issues as what should
be taught, who should be taught, whether the training should be
academic or experiential, the extent to which therapist-mediators
should be taught substantive and procedural aspects of divorce law,
and whether attorneys should be taught "body language" and the
7. The confidentiality of mediation sessions should be protected by an agreement
signed by the mediator as well as the couple.
8. The mediator should respect the autonomy of the couple.
9. Each spouse should have access to independent counsel at all times during the
mediation.
10. A full and complete disclosure of property and other assets, income, deductions,
liabilities, and present or projected monthly budgets is absolutely essential.
11. The mediator should always guard against any misuse of the mediation process by
either party.
12. The mediator has an obligation to raise all of the issues relating to a complete and
fair settlement.
13. The attorney(s) to whom an agreement is referred for drafting should always be
independent of the mediator.
14. Every mediator should be a professional in the best sense of that term.
Id. at 327-33.
130. Id. at 334-35.
131. See Sacks, Legal Education and the Changing Role of Lawyers in Dispute Resolution, 34 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 237 (1984). Professor Sacks, after noting the emphasis many law schools place on the litigation
aspects oflawyering, states as follows:
One cannot object to the successful development of training programs for the litigating
lawyer. The question is rather one of emphasis. Do we, without meaning to do so,
convey to students a misleading sense of the place that litigation in fact occupies in our
system, and perhaps even a distorted perspective of the place it ought to occupy? I do
not pretend to know. What troubles me is the feeling that our present emphasis on
litigation in law school study is not a function of a rounded analysis of the place of
litigation in the life of most practicing lawyers or in the provision of legal services
generally, or in the development of new law.
Id. at 244. See also Green, A Comprehensive Approach to the Theory and Practice of Dispute Resolution, 34 J.
LEGAL. EDUC. 245 (1984).
Forty-seven law schools currently offer alternative dispute resolution in their curriculum.
Riskin, Mediation in the Law Schools, 34J. LEGAL EDUC. 258, 260 n. 3 (1984). Of these, "[t]he new
CUNY Law School has taken the most dramatic step in this direction by including the study ot
mediation in three of its first-year courses, as part of an effort to thoroughly integrate mediation into
the curriculum." Id. at 263.
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emotional dynamics of divorce - as well as the standards and
certification problems discussed above. 
32
Those who contend that two people - usually one male and
one female, one a therapist and one an attorney - should co-
mediate argue that co-mediation (1) shows divorcing spouses how a
man and a woman can work together; (2) provides quality control
and peer support; (3) allows for a division of labor in the mediation;
and (4) avoids triangulation problems, since power, fairness, and
betrayal by the opposite sex are usually issues in a divorce.
Proponents of solo-mediation assert that co-mediation is too
expensive, increases the number of relationships in mediation from
three, with a solo mediator, to six, and is necessary onlyfor the
inexperienced.
2. Should Mediation be Mandatory or Voluntary?
Some mediation experts characterize mandatory mediation as
"a contradiction in terms" since mediation is at root a consensual
process.'33  Yet the jurisdictions that have made mediation
mandatory, such as California, Washington, and Broward County,
Florida, did so on the premise that once people were obligated to
try mediation, most found it highly satisfying. Without endorsing
mandatory mediation, the researchers in the field remain puzzled
by the finding that in all areas of the country - in both family
mediation and in other kinds of mediation - large percentages of-
those parties offered mediation in programs that are both cost-free
and voluntary turn it down. 
1 34
3. Should Mediation be Offered by the Courts, Private Agencies, or
Both?
Those who argue in favor of public mediation claim that if
mediation is taken over by the private sector, it will be available
132. See Moore, Training Mediators for Family Dispute Resolution (June, 1983) (materials
submitted for the National Institute for Family Dispute Resolution Conference, Los Angeles); Milne,
Mediation Practice and Training Standards, (June, 1983) (materials submitted for the National
Institute for Family Dispute Resolution Conference, Los Angeles).
133. SeeJ. Pearson, supra note 34, at 18.
134. Id. at 15-16. A study conducted by Jessica Pearson reveals that half of the disputants
offered free mediation services in custody and visitation matters in the Denver project rejected the
offer, 30% of those referred to a Brooklyn center for mediation of felony disputes between
acquaintances failed to appear and another 12% refused mediation outright, and the Neighborhood
Justice Centers reported attrition rates as high as 60%. Id. Though the reasons for lack of
participation in free mediation programs is uncertain, Pearson suggests the following possibilities:
(1) lack of public education about alternatives to adjudication; (2) ambivalence of the legal
community toward informal dispute resolution procedures; (3) use of existing neighborhood-based
dispute resolution forums or avoidance techniques to resolve disputes; and (4) lack of coercion to
which the disputant is subjected. Id. at 16-18.
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only to the upper and upper-middle classes. They also contend that
public mediation will be supervised, will assure competence, and
will result in fewer litigated dissolutions. 135 Those who raise
questions about, if not criticize, public mediation point out that
public mediators only mediate custody and visitation issues even
though in many .instances the distinction between financial and
custody issues is artificial. 136 The issue is complicated by the fact
that in many jurisdictions, the public mediator makes a custody
recommendation to the court if the mediation fails. Until recently
at least, that was the pattern in the Twin Cities metropolitan area
of Minnesota and is still true in all but two counties of California
under the state's mandatory mediation plan. 
137
4. Should Government Provide Incentives for Mediated Divorces?
Michigan allows a fee discount if a mediated agreement is
presented along with a petition for dissolution. 138 Alameda County,
135. See Brown, supra note 7, at 22-24, 26.
136. See Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 18, at 962-63. Mnookin and Kornhauser maintain
that the two elements - money and custody - are "inextricably linked for two reasons: over some
range of alternatives, each parent may be willing to exchange custodial rights and obligations for
income or wealth, and parents may tie support duties to custodial prerogatives as a means of
enforcing their rights without resort to court." Id. The authors explain:
Economic analysis suggests that a party may, over some range, trade custodial rights
for money. Although this notion may offend some, a contrary assertion would mean
that a parent with full custody would accept no sum of money in exchange for slightly
less custody, even if the parent were extremely poor. Faced with such alternatives,
most parents would prefer to see the child a bit less and be able to give the child better
housing, more food, more education, better health care, and some luxuries.
Suggesting the possibility of such trade-offs does not mean that the parent would be
willing to relinquish all time with the child for a sufficiently large sum of money.
Indeed, with a minimum level of resources, a parent may have a parallel minimum of
custodial rights for the reduction of which no additional payment, however large,
could be adequate compensation.
Id. at 964.
137. See Mclsaac, supra note 74, at 73, 74. Los Angeles and Santa Clara Counties in California
do not permit mediators to make recommendations to the court when mediation efforts fail. Id.
138. See MICH. Cosip. LAWs ANN. § 600.2528(1)( 0 (West Supp. 1985). Section 600.2528(I)(f)
provides as follows:
In the circuit court in a county having a population of less than 100,000 the following
fees shall be paid to the clerk of the court:
(f) Beginning July 1, 1983, in addition to the judgment fee provided in
subdivision (d) or (e), before entry of a final judgment in an action for divorce or
seperate maintenance where minor children are involved, or the entry of a final
judgment in a child custody dispute submitted to the circuit court as an original
action, 1 of the following sums, which shall be deposited by the county treasurer as
provided in section 2530:
(i) If the matter was contested or uncontested and was not submitted to domestic
relations mediation or investigation by the office of the friend of the court, $30.00.
(ii) If the matter was contested or uncontested and was submitted to domestic
relations mediation, $50.00.
(iii) If the matter was contested or uncontested and the office of the friend of the
court conducted an investigation and made a recommendation to the court, $70.00.
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California has an expedited calendar for mediated divorces and
allows the dissolution pleadings to be filed on simplified forms.
Colorado's dissolution statute authorizes a. summary dissolution for
divorces if the parties have mediated essential issues,' 39 and, as an
incentive to mediate, Middlesex County, Massachusetts requires
detailed briefs from attorneys at pretrial conferences if no mediated
settlement has been reached. 
140
5. Would a Mediation-Arbitration Sequence be Reasonable?
Some commentators have suggested that couples who reach an
impasse in mediation should be able to arbitrate sticky points. 141
That apparently was part of the original model of the Family
Mediation Association, 142 but after none of the first one hundred
mediations proceeded to arbitration, that organization abandoned
the plan. 143 Others think that the sequential combination should
remain available so long as someone other than the mediator does
the arbitration. 
4 4
Despite the seemingly inherent tension between the
noncoercive, facilitative role of the mediator and the adjudicative
function of the arbitrator, there are some who view med-arb (a
sequential process in which the mediator changes hats and
arbitrates the remaining, unmediated issues) as a practicable and
workable alternative dispute resolution device. 145
139. See COLO. REV. STAT. S 14-10-120.3 (Supp. 1986). Section 14-10-120.3 provides in part as
follows:
(1) Final orders in a proceeding for dissolution of marriage may be entered upon the
affidavit of either or both parties when:
(a) There are no minor children of the husband and wife, and the wife is not
pregnant, or the husband and wife are both represented by counsel and have
entered into a separation agreement granting custody to one or both parents
and setting out the amount of child support to be provided by the husband or
wife or both; and
(b) The adverse party is served in the manner provided by the Colorado rules
of civil procedure; and
(c) There is no genuine issue as to any material fact; and
(d) There is no marital property to be divided or the parties have entered into
an agreement for the division of their marital property.
Id.
140. See E. COMEAUX, A GuIDE TO IMPLEMENTINo DIVORCE MEDIATION SERVICES IN THE PUBLtC
SECrOR, 52 & n. 170 (1983).
141. See Meroney, supra note 11, at 477.
142. See 0. COOGLER, supra note 96, at 116.
143. See Meroney, supra note 11, at 483.
144. Spencer & Zammit, supra note 14, at 930-38.
145. The Mediation Center for Dispute Resolution has already conducted a med-arb sequence
in Minneapolis at the insistence of the parties' attorneys. Some private mediators agree that med-arb
is a practicable alternative dispute resolution device. Interview with Stephen Erickson, Co-principal
of Family Mediation Services, Minneapolis, Minnesota (Dec. 1, 1984).
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G. How MIGHT ATTORNEYS RESPOND TO MEDIATION?
Our professional experience reinforces the notion that disputes
are to be resolved by the application of general rules of law.
Leonard Riskin points out that quite different assumptions underlie
mediation, such as notions of fairness, cooperation, and creative
solutions unique to the disputants. 146 These different assumptions,
according to Riskin, account for mediation's absence from an
attorney's usual repertoire. 1
4 7
If attorneys are to play a role in advancing the public policy of
private ordering, then we should be familiar with mediation as an
option for some clients under appropriate circumstances. We should
forsake the intellectual arrogance that would seek to exclude
nonlawyers from the growing profession of mediators, so long as
the nonlawyers are well-trained and prepared. Yet, if attorneys fail
to learn enough about mediation to make informed judgments
about the standards, training, and work products of mediation,
others will fill the vacuum.
As more separating and separated couples seek to mediate
their divorces, an increasing number of attorneys will find clients
who retain them after they have made the decision to mediate.
Attorneys should continue to exercise their professional judgment
in advising their clients about mediated agreements. It will be in
the interest of both attorney and client for the attorney to be
involved early on in the mediation process. Those who
acknowledge the conciliatory facets of their personalities may wish
to undergo training and become part-time mediators. We urge
attorneys to accept the standing offer of many private mediators to
observe a mediation whenever the mediating couple consents. As
suggested recently by the chair of the American Bar Association's
Mediation Committee, lawyers can respond to mediation in one of
five ways: ignore it; stonewall it; live with it; join it; or improve
it. 1
48
V. OTHER ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION
METHODS
Arbitration and mediation are likely to be the alternatives of
choice for most disputants and attorneys who opt for alternative
146. Riskin, supra note 12, at 44.
147. Id.
148. G. Friedman, Lawyer's Reaction to Family Law Mediation: Knee Jerk or Justified? 4




dispute resolution methods. However, there are other, more
esoteric, options available as well. Some of them would be
appropriate for family law disputes.
A. MINI-TRIALS
Despite its misnamed sobriquet, a mini-trial is not an
abbreviated trial. Rather, it is a specifically structured settlement
device that shows both parties the strengths and weaknesses of their
positions. Mini-trials first arose in 1977 in an extremely complex
case in which Telecredit, Inc. contended that TRW, Inc. had
infringed on Telecredit's patents on computerized charge
authorization and credit verification devices. 14 9 Discovery had
already cost each side hundreds of thousands of dollars when the
attorneys negotiated a process for resolving the case
inexpensively. 50 Each party's attorney presented his best case, in
one-half day, using technical experts to flesh out the
presentation. 151 Each side then had an opportunity to rebut the
adverse party's presentation, followed by an open question-and-
answer period.152 A neutral "advisor" was hired to moderate the
discussion, submit technical questions in advance to the expert
witnesses, participate in the question-and-answer sessions, and
revolve prehearing discovery issues. 153 If the parties had been
unable to settle, the "advisor" was to render a nonbinding
opinion regarding the strengths and weaknesses of each side. 154 The
presentations were made to two top-management officials of each
company, who achieved an outline for eventual settlement within
one half-hour after the end of the mini-trial. 
155
In a family law matter, the presentation would be made to the
husband and wife, who would then, for the first time, hear the case
for the other side and have a glimpse of the expert testimony. The
parties could agree to any procedural rules, but they would
probably borrow certain notions from the Telecredit case. Some of
the procedural rules the couple may consider include the following:
limiting the scope of the advisor's power; disqualifying the advisor
as a trial witness, expert, or consultant for either side in the event
149. Green, Marks, & Olson, Settling Large Case Litigation: An Alternative Approach, 11 Loy.
L.A.L. REV. 493, 501 (1978).
150. Id. at 502-03.
151. Id. at 503.
152. Id. at 506.
153. Id. at 503-04.
154. Id. at 503.
155. Id. at 506.
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that no settlement eventuated; protecting all statements, testimony,
and evidence employed at the mini-trial from attack at trial; and
jettisoning the rules of evidence. 
15 6
The mini-trial is a structured and very sophisticated variant of
mediation in that no third party has coercive power to render a
decision. But it also contains some aspects of arbitration, such as
presentations by counsel, negotiated rules of evidence, expert
witnesses, legal arguments, and structured, if truncated,
discovery. 157 A mini-trial might work well where each party has
potential risk on mixed issues of law and fact, such as tracing non-
marital assets, ascertaining spousal interest in a closely held
business, or valuing the contribution of one spouse to the advanced
degree of the other. One of the attorneys in the Telecredit case
estimated that the cost of the mini-trial was approximately one-
tenth the projected cost of fully litigating the matter. 15 If the
parties had not settled, virtually all of the mini-trial preparation
would have been applicable to the necessary preparation of a
regular trial. 159
B. DEcISION ANALYSIS
Decision analysis is a formalized cost-benefit method used by
businesses to determine whether to take a particular matter to
court. 16 0 John Wolf, former president of the Minneapolis-based
Mediation Center for Dispute Resolution, suggests that the
analysis so formulated could be easily converted to an alternative
dispute resolution method. 161 If the parties could agree on the issues
at stake, each could then carefully estimate the probable range of
values of an award favorable to its side and could calculate the costs
and risks of litigating rather than settling. The alternative dispute
resolution method would consist of conducting settlement
negotiations by confining arguments to differences in the cost-
156. See id. at 503-05 (procedural rules invoked by the parties in the Telecredit case).
157. Olson, Dispute Resolution. An Alternative for Large Case Litigation, HENNEPIN LAW., May-June
1984, at 14, 35.
158. Id. at 33.
159. Id.
160. Bodily, When Should You go to Court?, HARV. Bus. REV. May-June 1981, at 103, 103.
Decision analysis is a technique employed by many companies to cut costs of litigation and damage
awards through formulaic determination of the efficacy of a settlement and the dollar range
acceptable to both parties. Id. at 103-04. As one advocate of the technique explains: "A typical
decision analysis forcasts the probability of each possible outcome and estimates its financial costs or
benefits. Alternative strategies are evaluated in terms of their financial impacts on the company." Id.
at 104.
161. See Wolf, supra note 30, at 9. Wolf, who prefers the term "present value analysis" to
"decision analysis," suggests that the procedure "be done by each party separately, with the option




benefit analyses, or, alternatively, of presenting the analyses to a
neutral third party advisor who would comment on the derivations
and accuracy of each calculation, but who would not render any
decision. 162
In a family law context, a case with intricate property issues or
inchoate property rights, such as stock options or unvested
pensions or even a difficult spousal maintenance problem, might
lend itself to negotiations shorn of rhetoric and focused on decision
analysis. Such negotiations may impel a settlement, which would
save money for both sides once the risks and costs became clear.
C. "MED-ARB"
The term "med-arb" (pronounced "meed-arb") is a
contraction and combination of mediation and arbitration. It
describes a process that should not be workable in theory but which
may be quite effective in practice. Philosophically, mediation as a
consensual process requires a neutral third-party who has no power
but who employs his or her skills in refraining questions,
generating new options, and balancing power to assist a couple in
finding their own solutions.1 63 An arbitrator, on the other hand, is
contractually empowered by the parties to make decisions for them.
In theory, then, to mix the two roles is to contaminate the functions
of both the mediator and the arbitrator. But many experienced
mediators have discovered that in actual practice, some couples
who genuinely want to dissolve their marriages amicably and have
mediated all but one or two difficult issues would prefer to have the
mediator, whom they trust, break the deadlock rather than begin
anew with another stranger. 164 For those couples who reject
mediation out of fear that a failure to resolve all questions will
merely cost them time and money in addition to large legal fees for
litigation, med-arb will guarantee finality because the parties
determine when to end mediation.
D. FOUR-PARTY CONFERENCES
A four-party conference is simply a meeting of the parties and
their lawyers. Attorneys routinely convene such conferences to
bring closure to settlements. It can, however, be used for
162. Id.
163. J. FOLBERG & A. TAYLOR, supra note 16, at 239.
164. Interview with Stephen Erickson, Co-principal of Family Mediation Services of Minnesota
(Dec. 1, 1984).
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creative dispute resolution if the attorneys are so inclined.
Typically, in a divorce, settlement negotiations comprise serial
conversations from client to lawyer to opposing counsel to adverse:
spouse and back again. In the process each client can become more
entrenched and more convinced that his or her spouse is stubborn,
unreasonable, and unfair. Although the attorneys are advocates,
not mediators or arbitrators, they can utilize a four-party
conference to generate solutions in a way that accommodates the
needs and concerns of both parties. Not only is the process more
efficient and less expensive than the sequential transmission
method, it also fosters a more active role for the disputants. It fits
the "private ordering" criterion for any client for whom personal
autonomy is an important consideration.
VI. WHY NO QUEUES?
If alternative dispute resolution is such a good idea for family
law matters, why is there such a small demand for it? The authors
could find no record of an arbitrated divorce, mini-trial, or decision
analysis employed anywhere in the Midwest. The authors know of
only one med-arb in Minnesota, and that was in a postdecretal
matter.165 Despite a flourishing of trained mediators in such places
as Minneapolis, St. Paul, Chicago, and Portland, reports from all
four cities indicate that the supply of mediators greatly exceeds the
demand by couples to actually mediate their divorces. 166
The reason for the discrepancy is apparently attributable to
the opposition of the family law bar. Virtually every person whose
marriage dissolves seeks an attorney, but few attorneys recommend
that their clients attempt mediation. Some explicitly oppose
mediation, and an uncertain, but large, number sabotage mediated
agreements by insisting that certain crucial provisions be deleted.
At some point, an attorney may commit malpractice by failing
to advise his or her client of the alternative methods for getting
divorced. In the meantime, only the creative attorneys are either
using or recommending such options. No one method is likely to
suit everyone. We best serve our clients by presenting all of the
options, along with our reasoned opinion about the advantages and
disadvantages of each method.
165. Survey conducted by co-author Weissman under the auspices of the Mediation Center for
Dispute Resolution.
166. Interviews with Lee Howard, president of the Illinois Mediation Council (Dec. 19, 1984);
Marilyn McKnight, president of the Minnesota Mediation Council (Jan. 8, 1985); and Susan
Isaacs, therapist-mediator in Portland, Oregon (Jan. 4, 1985).
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